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Rowley: The Attack on Boulogne

The Attack on Boulogne
Account by Lieutenant-Colonel Roger Rowley, OC,
Stormont, Dundas & Glengarry Highlanders given to
Historical Officer, 21 September 1944

BOULOGNE was prepared for all-round
defence. In addition to its heavy coastal
fortifications the city was also made ready
against land attack. For this it offers excellent
topographical advantages. The town is
enclosed by a semicircle of high ground whose
natural focus is the centrally located MONT
LAMBERT. throughout this semicircle an
elaborate system of mutually supporting
strongpoints was constructed to make a
formidable shield about the port. All positions
were of three basic types, or combinations of
types:
coastal defence batteries, radar
installations, and infantry positions.

The problem was solved by positioning
8th and 9th Canadian Infantry Brigades
astride the BOULOGNE- LA CAPELLE road,
which was to be the axis of attack, and by
leaving the whole left flank, extending in a
wide arc to the channel south of the city, to a
single Machine Gun battalion, the Cameron
Highlanders of Ottawa. This unit, with
attached troops, thus played the part of a
"dummy brigade," and by various deceptive
measures endeavoured to create an
impression of equal strength in that quarter.
The extreme right flank was guarded by 7th
Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment.

ST. MARTIN-BOULOGNE, which was
included in the initial objective for Stormont,
Dundas & Glengarry Highlanders, was an
infantry position, both mined and wired.
Mines were also known to be placed south of
LA COCHERIE WOOD. Within the city itself
were further fortifications; the port, for
example, had been set apart from the rest of
the town by a concrete wall and barbed wire.

Topographical considerations, as already
noted, were of prime importance. The enemy
very naturally occupied the more
advantageous ground. The approaches to
his strongpoints were all covered by mutually
supporting infantry and artillery positions.
It was necessary therefore to smother the
defenders with a weight of bombs and shells
until the attacking infantry could cross the
intervening ground and come to grips with
them. The path of Stormont, Dundas &
Glengarry Highlanders, as will be seen, lay in
fairly low ground between strongly armed
heights.

The strength of the garrison had been
estimated at from 5,500 to 7,000, which
proved to be too modest a figure. The state of
its morale, however, was accurately judged
as being somewhat heartless.
The task of capturing BOULOGNE and
destroying its garrison was assigned to 3rd
Canadian Infantry Division on 5 September
1944. But it had also to assume responsibility
for the defended coastal area as far as CALAIS.
This secondary task being allotted to 7th
Canadian Infantry Brigade, left only two
brigades available for the assault on
BOULOGNE.

The River LIANE, which protected the
southernmost forts against attack from the
east, was expected to offer a barrier to later
stages of the operation.
Ninth Canadian Infantry Brigade was to
commence the attack with two battalions
up-Stormont, Dundas & Glengarry
Highlanders on the right and North Nova
Scotia Highlanders on the left. When Phase
I, the capture ofLA COCHERIE, was complete,
three armoured assault teams of 31st Tank
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Brigade were to proceed into BOULOGNE to
seize the bridges of the LIANE. Each armoured
team consisted of one troop of 1st Lothians
(Flails), two troops of 141 Royal Armoured
Corps (Crocodiles) and one half troop from
6th Assault Regiment, Royal Engineers
(AVREs). Each team had also under command
one platoon of infantry-two from Stormont,
Dundas & Glengarry Highlanders and one
from North Nova Scotia Highlanders. Teams
A and B were to operate with Stormont,
Dundas & Glengarry Highlanders, two of
whose companies were to follow on foot to
clear the river area and establish a firm base
so that engineers could begin work there.
The balance of the battalion was to capture
the citadel ofBOULOGNE. In this it was to be
assisted by two AVREs (One half troop).
Phase III was to be the capture of the
northern part of the OUTREAU peninsula
(the area centred on LE PORTEL). The final
phase was to be the capture of the NOCQUET
feature.
For Phase I, Stormont, Dundas &
Glengarry Highlanders had under command
one troop ofMlOs (3-inch SP anti-tank guns)
and in support two troops of tanks from lOth
Canadian Armoured Regiment, one half troop
87 Assault Squadron, Royal Engineers, one
section 18 Canadian Field Company, Royal
Canadian Engineers, 20 Kangaroos and seven
armoured troop carriers. In later phases
allotment of these devices varied with the
nature of the task.
The Kangaroos are "stripped" Priests, i.e.
105 mm Self-Propelled equipments (minus
the gun), converted into troop carriers. Their
task was to carry the assault troops as far as
the bomb-cratered area, discharge their
passengers and return to a rally to await
orders. In addition six other Kangaroos were
to go forward with the special armour teams
to seize the LIANE bridges.
Stormont, Dundas & Glengarry
Highlanders were also allotted certain flamethrowing devices: Lifebuoys (portable flamethrowers), and a section of Wasps (carriermounted flame-throwers), from 7th Canadian
Reconnaissance Regiment.

Air support was arranged to begin before
the operation with the heavy bombing of five
selected areas of the defence system. The
first and largest target, which included the
MONT LAMBERT feature, was to be subjected
to an hour's attack, at the conclusion of
which the land operation was to commence.
During this time forward troops were to be
withdrawn 2,000 yards from the perimeter of
the target area. From H+ 1 to H+3 hours the
other four areas were to be engaged. In
addition, rocket bombers and fighter bombers
were to be available on call.
The fire plan was most extensive. An
impressive weight of artillery, including two
AGRAs, had been assembled. Every potential
centre of enemy resistance and interference
had been allotted a series of "stonks" and
concentrations. An unusual feature of was
the assignment of two heavy AA regiments to
fire low airburst concentrations over known
flak positions during the course of the bombing
effort.
For additional fire support Stormont,
Dundas & Glengarry Highlanders could call
on their own 3-inch mortars and a platoon of
4. 2-inch mortars. There were no prearranged
mortar targets; their fire could be asked for
by giving map references in clear. As it
happened, they were not called on.
At 0855 hours, 17 September 1944, the
first wave of Lancaster bombers appeared
over the BOULOG NE area and the air
programme began. At 0955 hours, just as the
last bombs fell on Target 1, Stormont, Dundas
& Glengarry Highlanders moved forward from
their assembly area near LA CAPELLE and
crossed the startline. The Kangaroos bearing
the two assault companies drove forward
until mines made further progress impossible;
the troops then debussed and advanced to
their objectives. "D" Company on the right
proceeded to the road junction at ST. MARTINBOULOGNE and "B" Company on the left
seized a stretch of the BOULOGNE- DESVRES
road. Behind them, on foot, "C" Company
cleared and captured the woods at LA
COCHERIE. "A" Company held in reserve.
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Lancasters of RAF Bomber Command attacking Mont Lambert near Boulogne on the morning of 1 7 September
1944. At least nine aircraft are visible in the photo.
WLU Air Photo 183 I 4058
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The bombing had done its work well. All
positions were captured by H+45 minutes.
The hardest fighting was done by "D" Company
who ran into a minefield in the draw running
south from LA COCHERIE Wood along the 71
grid line. This necessitated an assault on foot
of 1,000 metres without armoured support,
for the tanks were also held up in the dead
ground of the minefield. "B" Company had
de bussed in the mined area and proceeded to
its objective without event. Subsequently,
"C", "D" and particularly "B" Companies were
subjected to very heavy and extremely
accurate shelling.

daylight (the change from "B" to "A" time was
made on 17 September 1944) was very
strikingly demonstrated here.

The disadvantage of the terrain was now
painfully evident. On the right, beyond the
road lay heights not yet seized by 8th Canadian
Infantry Brigade. On the left the slopes of
MONT LAMBERT were still not in the hands
of the North Nova Scotia Highlanders. And
from the southwest, beyond the river, the
battalion area was in view of enemy positions.
Form all these points came heavy artillery fire
which made movement almost impossible.

Arriving at the citadel, which was entirely
surrounded, castle-fashion, by a high wall,
"D" Company got into position before the
bastion gate under cover of smoke. Then
commenced a strange drama of medieval siege
mingled with modern warfare. A French
civilian approached and offered to point out a
secret tunnel leading into the heart of the
citadel.
Major Stothard, the company
commander, taking with him one platoon, at
once entered the tunnel.

Under this fire an engineer officer of 18
Canadian Field Company did excellent work
directing the clearing of the minefield up to
the crossroads. The sole available bulldozer
had gone astray and the work all had to be
done by hand.
Late in the afternoon the two armoured
columns of 31st Tank Brigade arrived. It had
originally been intended that Column A should
proceed along the BOULOGNE- LA CAPELLE
road, but the CO had found this impassable
owing to road blocks. It was therefore
necessary to send both columns along B's
route (the southern road) as far as the ST.
MARTIN junction. This route had now been
cleared for them.
Phase II therefore commenced with the
two assault teams setting out for the bridges.
The two accompanying infantry platoons were
supplied by"A" Company. ColumnA, starting
first, went very well, but had to stop short of
its objective at darkness. Column B had g~t
off to a bad start owing to deteriorating light
conditions and also came to a halt within the
city. The effect of the loss of one hour's

The next morning, 18 September 1944,
the battalion started out on its part of Phase
II. "B" and "C" Companies followed the
armoured teams. "D" Company and the
battalion command group proceeded along A
Team's route, their task being the capture of
the citadel. With them went two AVREs. The
remaining platoon of "A" Company which
accompanied them was reserved as escort for
PW.

At the same time the Churchills wheeled
up, raking the ramparts with Besa fire, and
prepared to place petards against the
portcullis. The gate was effectively blown in.
At once a host of white flags waved from the
walls. To add to the confusion Major Stothard
had by now appeared in the midst of the
besieged fort, utterly astonishing its
"defenders."
The CO was sent for to take over the
citadel. About 200 PW, including sixteen
officers, were rounded up, most of whom were
drunk and happy to be out of the war. The
garrison was commanded by a major, who
was as pleased as the rest. Also present was
a German Oberstleutnant, formerly head of
the military tribunal. A fairly large proportion
were marines. More PW were taken during
the day.
Meanwhile Columns A and B had reached
the river bank where they found the bridges
blown. "B" and "C" Companies established
themselves there. Thus ended Phase II.

79

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol3/iss2/11

4

Rowley: The Attack on Boulogne

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1994

5

Canadian Military History, Vol. 3 [1994], Iss. 2, Art. 11

Stormont, Dundas &
Glengarry
Highlanders then rested until further orders
were issued at an "0" Group at 1500 hours
the next day, 19 September 1944. The
battalion had now to capture an objective
somewhat enlarged from that originally
planned for Phase III. It consisted of four
features: the battery position on the 80 ring
contour; the suburb of OUTREAU; the
reservoir on the hill; and the two sugar
factories. (See sketch map and air photo on
the next page) To do this they were to pass
through the bridgehead held by Highland
Light Infantry of Canada on the west bank of
the LIANE. Zero hour was 1600 hours and
preparations had to be made quickly.
At the outset "A" Company found its path
blocked by mines. As time was limited, "D"
Company was directed on OUTREAU with
orders, should opposition be light, to push on
and take the gun position. Very shortly,
however, "A" Company was able to extricate
itself from the minefield and arrived on its
objective on time, taking the village after little
fighting and capturing numerous PWs.
"C" Company meanwhile was likewise held
up at the start. Their route took them past
the mouth of the railway tunnel running
northwest from the road and track junction,
from which came forth an embarrassing
number of PW. Here they were forced to
dispose of over 200 men, including perhaps
30 black Senegalese complete with fez.
Proceeding forward once again, they took the
reservoir area, again without heavy fighting.
Phase 2 was much more difficult. The gun
position on the hill west ofOUTREAU number
15 pieces in all, including six 88 mm guns.

Opposite Top: This air photo shows the citadel in the
centre of Boulogne attacked by the SDGs. At the
bottom left comer the River Liane is visible. Column B
bridged the river at the railway crossing at the bottom
of the photo while Column A established itself just
above where the river leaves the photo at the left.
WLU Air Photo 15 7 I 4099
Opposite Bottom: A bridge-laying Churchill A VRE of
the 79th Armoured Division inBoulogneon 16 September 1944.
Photo by D.I. Grant, NAC PA 131234

But the enemy gunners were engrossed in
heavy shelling of Highland Light Infantry and
failed to notice "D" Company forming up in
the woods east of the hill.
The hill itself was included among the
potential artillery tasks and was known by
the codeword "Norway." (See sketch map and
air photo) The target had been allotted one
medium concentration and four field "stonks."
Observing that the nearest stonk would fall
too near his own position, Major Stothard,
the Company Commander, therefore called
for "Norway, less Target 118." The result was
magnificent surprise. The infantry, following
the fire closely, swarmed over the hill with
bayonets and grenades before the last rounds
had fallen. At no time were they more than
250 yards from the bursts. The nearest
position was overrun and its three 88s taken
intact; the troops rushed for the other three,
but these were blown up. The action resulted
in the taking of 185 PW, but during it Major
Stothard's only two remaining officers were
wounded. It was now nearly dark and the
company consolidated its position and
remained on the hill all night.
The following morning one of the 88s was
manned and fired against the enemy, the
laying being done by two gunner officers. In
three rounds a direct hit was made of another
88 in LE PORTEL which knocked it out.
With the capture of the sugar factories,
the battalion's fighting in BOULOGNE was
almost done. A few strongpoints remained
yet to be dealt with, but the city itself and its
most formidable defences were cleared of the
enemy.
Despite the well-prepared defences of the
BOULOGNE fortress, little use was made by
Stormont, Dundas & Glengarry Highlanders
of the special mechanical devices which had
been provided. Following the paralysing blow
delivered by the bombers, the attack took
shape along the familiar infantry pattern,
valuable use being made of artillery support.
An exception must be made in favour of the
Kangaroos, which had two roles: (i) to bring
the infantry swiftly forward from a safe area
beyond the bombing limits, and (ii) to retain
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The German strongpoint "Norway" which contained six 88s and nine smaller calibre weapons is clearly visible
at the bottom of the air photo. To the right. at the edge of the photo is the woods where the SDGsformed upfor
the attack.
Insert: Sketch map showing the SDGs Phase III objectives.
WLU Air Photo 18113036
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A column of over 400 German prisoners pass through the damaged streets of Boulogne, 21 Sept 44.
Photo by D.I. Grant, NAC PA 137309

momentum and exploit into the city once the
first objective was seized. These tasks were
performed very well.
The special armoured teams, moving with
great swiftness, were not called on to employ
their Flails or Crocodiles. Nor was extensive
use made of the AVREs, beyond the instance
referred to above. The move the armoured
teams Lieutenant-Colonel Rowley described
as satisfactory but uneventful.
No suitable opportunity to use the Wasps
was found. One was in fact knocked out by
shellfire. They are nonetheless regarded as
an excellent weapon and have been found
ineffectual by the CO. Company commanders
invariably asked for them. Owing to their
cumbersome weight and vulnerability they
travel in the rear of the column to be brought
forward if necessary.
A Lifebuoy flame-thrower was used by "D"
Company against a pillbox near ST. MARTINBOULOGNE; one squirt promptly brought
forth 25 PW. On the whole, however, their
performance in this operation was not
satisfactory, only about 45% of them being in
working order when needed. This, the CO
felt, was to be explained first, by their fragility,
and secondly, by the fact that it had not been
possible to train those who were to fire them.
Even granting their delicate nature, in the

hands of an experienced operator they are a
reliable and effective weapon.
Lieutenant-Colonel Rowley remarked of
the bombing that it had been slightly off its
mark near MONT LAMBERT but had so
splattered the objectives of the leading
companies, instead of hitting LA COCHERIE
Wood, that it actually eased their advance.
The fire plan as originally conceived had
been excellent and in the closing stages
continued to be so. Every possible enemy
position had been taped and the response of
the gunners had never been quicker.
As for the enemy, despite his numerical
strength and the almost impregnable
character of his fortifications. it was obvious
that his morale left much to be desired. Given
greater determination on his part, the
debussing process from the Kangaroos, for
example, could have been turned into a
slaughter. The whole operation, moreover,
would have been a much more costly
undertaking.
Concerning weapons,
Lieutenant-Colonel Rowley said only one
mortar had been encountered and that had
been quickly eliminated by the carrier platoon.
Finally, the CO said that his men had a
thorough dislike for Germans. Therefore the
operation went welL
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